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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 80-1832, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 
(appeal of INS from CA9 decision with which it 
agrees) 
No. 80-2170 House of Representatives v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service 
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by House) 
No. 80-2171 Senate v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by Senate) 
I am attaching the papers and have come up with two ways 
to avoid review without finding that the case does not present a 
substantial federal question. Before discussing them, I thought 
just a few words on the SG's suggestion might be hepful. 
The SG's suggestion is at 2-3 of his Memorandum for the 
Federal Resp. in Nos. 80-2170 & 80-2171. The SG argues that the INS 
appeal in No. 80-1832 has "an inherrent priority that petitions for 
a writ of certiorai do not share." The SG concedes that there is 
some question as to whether this case is within the Court's 
2. 
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appellate jurisdiction, however, and suggests a way in which the 
case could be handled so as to avoid wasting this Court's time in 
the event it finds there is no proper jurisdictional basis for the 
INS appeal: the Court could hold the petns for cert in Nos. 80-2170 
& 80-2171 pending determination of the jurisdictional question in 
No. 80-1832. If, after argument, the Court finds that there is no 
jurisdiction, it could then grant these petns and use them to 
dispose of the substantive issues. 
This of course presumes that the Court wants to dispose of 
the major sustantive issue (the constitutionality of the one-house 
veto) in a case with as many quirks as this one. 
The SG is, of course, right in saying that the Court must 
decide whether it has jurisdiction over the INS appeal, just as it 
must decide whether it has jurisdiction over any other appeal. It 
is also true that the most common reason for dismissing an appeal--
the lack of a substantial federal question--would not appear to be 
available for disposing of this case~ the constitutionality of the 
one-house legislative veto presents a quite substantial federal 
question. 
There are, however, two bases I see for dismissing this 
appeal without hearing further argument on jurisdiction (or any 
argument on the merits): (1) dismiss and deny because there is no 
aggrieved party seeking this Court's review in the appeal (No. 80-
1832) and the Court chooses not to exercise its discretionary cert 
jurisdiction~ and (2) dismiss for lack of a properly presented 
federal question. 
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1. Dismiss and deny. Only an aggieved party may seek 
this Court's review of a decision of a lower court. The parties to 
this appeal are the INS and Chadha (the individual whose deportation 
is at issue) with the House and Senate appearing as amici. Of these 
participants, only INS and Chadha seek this Court's review by way of 
appeal, and neither of them is aggrieved by the decision below. 
Indeed, both of them agree with it. The House and Senate disgree 
with the CA9's decision, but they have filed amicus briefs in No. 
80-1832 (the appeal) arguing that it should be dismissed because it 
has been brought by the parties that prevailed below. 
I think the House and Senate are right and the appeal 
should be dismissed, qua appeal, on the ground that no one who is 
aggrieved has appealed. The jurisdictional statement can then be 
treated as a cert petn and denied, along with the cert petns filed 
by the House and Senate, because the Court chooses not to exercise 
its discretionary jurisdiction. 
The discussion of this point--whether there is a 
sufficiently aggrieved party to sustain this Court's review--in the 
pool memo is somewhat unfocused. It is important to keep two 
questions distinct: (1) is there an aggrieved party seeking review 
by way of appeal in No. 80-1832? and (2) is there sufficient 
"adversariness" to present a case or controversy to this Court 
should this Court wish to consider the issues presented in the cert 
petns (Nos. 80-2170 & 80-2071) filed by amici who were opposed to 
the decison below? 
The two cases cited in the pool memo on this point, United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); United States v. Smith, 286 
4. 
u.s. 6 (1932) both involve grants of cert in cases in which the only 
party seeking to overrule the lower court were amici (the Senate in 
Smith and both houses in Lovett), though the petns themselves seem 
to have been filed by the SG or Attorney General to give amici a 
forum. Although the Court did not, in these cases, consider whether 
amici could create "adversariness" when a cert petn was filed, the 
Court did allow each suit to continue. I think these cases do, 
therefore, provide strong support for the proposition that an 
aggieved amici can be an aggieved party for purposes of envoking 
this Court's review. 
Fortunately, however, the aggrieved amici in our cases 
only seek the Courts' review by way of cert not appeal. As 
mentioned above, they actually oppose the grant of the INS' appeal 
and have filed their own petns for cert. 
Since no aggrieved participant, whether amici or pltf or 
deft, seeks this Court's app~late review, I think the appeal in 
No. 80-1832 can be dismissed with, perhaps, a few words to that 
effect in the dismissal order. 
2. Dismiss appeal for want of a properly presented 
federal question. Assuming, arguendo, that there is an aggrieved 
party seeking this Court's appellate review, the appeal in No. 80-
1832 could be dismissed for want of a properly presented federal 
question. The pool memo states that Chadha is now married to an 
American. Because Chadha's wife has not filed an "immediate 
relative" petition with the INS, he is still deportable if the 
decision of the CA9 is overruled. Actually, however, it seems most 
unlikely that he will be deported. Presumably, the wife has not 
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filed a petition because she does not want to moot this controversy, 
but, if she did file one, it would, presumably, be granted because 
such petitions seem to be granted on a routine basis. 
Moreover, it appears that the CA9 was wrong in thinking 
that, at the time of its decision, Chadha retained a live interest 
in the outcome of this controversy because, if he were allowed to 
become a citizen as a result of this case, the five-year waiting 
period for citizenship would have expired already, whereas he will 
have to wait five years if his wife files an immediate-relative 
petition. {See n.6 of CA9 decision at 18a of Jurisdictional 
Statement in No. 80-1832.) As the Senate points out in its petn in 
No. 80-2171, n.lO at 15, the CA9 has ignored 8 u.s.c. §1254{d), 
which provides that the five-year period begins to run from the time 
the deportation order is cancelled {the time of the CA9's decision). 
The changed situtation may not, perhaps, technically moot 
the case--because Chadha's wife has not filed an immediate-relative 
petition--but the case can be now be treated as one in which there 
is no properly presented federal question under Poe v. Ullman, 367 
U.S. 497 {1961). In that case, married persons and their doctor 
sought a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of a 
Conneticut statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices or 
the giving of medical advice about them. The state courts upheld 
the statute, even as applied to married couples and despite 
allegations that conception would pose a serious threat to the 
health of the plaintiff-wives. There was no opinion of the Court. 
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Chief Justice warren and Justices 
~~ 
Clark and Whittaker, found the case not meet for adjudiction. He 
stressed the absence of any specific threat of enforcement and the 
long history of non-enforcement, despite the open and well-known 
sale of contraceptives in drug stores in the state. He found the 
6. 
controversy inappropriate for constitutional adjudication. Justice 
Brennan concurred in the result, stating that there would be time 
enough to decide these constitutional issues when a "real 
controversy flares up again." Id. at 509. 
I think the Court could dispose of the case under Poe v. 
Ullman. It is most unlikely this Court's decision will have any 
practical impact. Moreover, all the participants, even Chadha, want 
this court to review (either on appeal, see papers of Chadha & INS 
in No. 80-1832, or on cert, see House and Senate Petitions in Nos. 
80-2170 & 80-2171) the legality of the one-house veto. This gives 
the suit a somewhat collusive air. Indeed, it seems liklely that 
the case would be completely moot--Chadha's wife would have 
petitioned for a change in his status--but for the desire of all the 
lawyers to see the constitutionality of the one-house veto resolved 
in this case. It seems inappropriate to resolve a major 
constitutional issue in a case which is kept alive only to have this 
Court determine the issue, rather than because this Court's decision 
will have a practical impact. 
This appeal is, therefore, like that in Poe v. Ullman, an 
inappropriate vehicle for adjudication of the very difficult 
questions presented and should be dismissed for want of a properly 
~r"-.ps 1 
federal question. The dimissal could~onsist of a brief statement 
to this effect, citing Poe v. Ullman. 
meb 09/15/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 80-1832, Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 
{appeal of INS from CA9 decision with which it 
agrees) 
No. 80-2170 House of Representatives v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Service 
{petn for cert to CA9 brought by House) 
No. 80-2171 Senate v. Immigration & Naturalization Service 
{petn for cert to CA9 brought by Senate) 
I want to clarify a point that may have been confusing in my 
earlier memo. Although the House and Senate were amici below, it 
might have been possible for them to appeal as well as petition for 
cert. The words of both statutes {proper party to appeal or to file - fli'e 
for cert) ~ the same: "any party" {the "aggrieved-party" 
requirement is judicial gloss needed to ensure the presence of a 
case or controversy) . 
Although the two earlier cases in which amici were allowed to 
supply "adversariness," Lovett and Smith, both involved cert 
petitions, I am not sure that there is a principled reason for 
distinguishing an appeal brought by such a participant. We do not 
need to worry about whether our amici can appeal or provide 
2. 
adversatness in an appeal brought by a non-aggrieved party, however, 
~ 
because the House and Senate not only did not appeal, they oppose 
the grant of the appeal brought by INS. 
d~ 
I may be missingJobvious reason why the House and Senate 
cannot appeal. Gressman (of Stern & Gressman) is on the brief for 
the House and would not have filed a petition (rather than 
supporting a note of jurisdiction in the appeal) unless he saw some 
reason for preferring review by way of cert. (Perhaps he thought the 
Court would be more likely to hear the merits if it could narrow the 
issues it would consider, which would not be possible in an appeal. 
This concern would not, however, eliminate all the threshold 
questions since many of them are jurisdictional.) 
meb 09/26/81 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Mary 
In Re: No. 80-1832, INS v. Chadha. 
(appeal of INS from CA9 decision with which it 
agrees) 
No. 80-2170 House of Representatives v. INS 
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by House) 
No. 80-2171 Senate v. INS 
(petn for cert to CA9 brought by Senate) 
I took another look at this case to analyze the SG's reply 
brief. But that got me thinking, and now I have a whole new theory 
that may explain why Gressman wants the Court to take the case on 
cert rather than review on appeal. 
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Briefly stated, if this Court decides that the case is 
neither moot nor an inappropiate vehicle (given Chadha's marriage to 
an American) for the resolution of a constitutional issue under Poe 
v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497 (1961) (inappropriate to decide 
constitutional issue in case in which its resolution will have no 
practical effect, see discussion in my memo of Sept. 14 at 5-6), and 
if the Court reviews the case as an appeal under §1252, it is most 
likely the Court will reach the one-house legislative-veto issue. 
Congress prefers review by way of cert, because that form of review 
r-- ------is likely to result in overruling the CA9 opinion, thus removing a 
CA holding that a one-house legislative veto is unconstitutional, 
and yet avoid this Court's resolution of the one-house legislative 
veto issue. Instead, the basis of decision will probably be the 
"statutory" issue: was the CA9, rather that a DC, the proper forum - ----for Chadha's challenge? 
---------------------This memo first explains why the Court will not have to 
decide the "statutory" question if review is by cert rather than 
appeal. It then discusses the other threshold issues very briefly 
to show that they are unlikely to stand in the way of reaching the 
one-house legislative veto issue. Third, it discusses whether 
review by appeal is possible (arguing that, on the basis of the 
papers now before the Court, the Court is in the very unusual 
position of being free to either take or deny the appeal). This 
portion of the memo includes a discussion of the SG's reply brief 
I I '"' which argues that INS has standing to bring an appeal despite its 
-------~------~·-------------
~ agreement with the decision below. Fourth, the memo discusses 
3. 
whether the Court should vacate the CA9 opinion if it decides not to 
take the case. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Why Does Form of Review Matter? 
The usual rule is that an appellate court lacks 
jurisdiction to review a lower court decision if the lower court 
lacked juisdiction. Thus, for example, this Court will not usually 
review (on the merits) a decision made by a DC if the DC lacked 
jurisdiction because the case should have been brought in a three-
judge court. 
Appeals under §~2 are an exception. In McLucas v. 
,____ 
Champlain, 421 u.s. 21 (1975) (Powell, J.), it seemed likely the 
pltf should have asked for a three-judge court. If so, the failure 
was jurisdictional. The Court nevertheless reached the merits and 
held that this Court's jurisdiction over a §1252 appeal does not 
depend on whether the lower court had jurisdiction. The Court 
explained this exception in terms of the policies and purposes of 
§1252: prompt S. Ct. review of civil actions in which the U.S. is a 
party and an act of Congress is held unconstitutional. This policy 
would be thwarted if the parties were required to go back to a 
three-judge court and begin another proceeding prior to invoking 
this Court's review. 
5~ 
In the case at bar, the "statutory question" is whether~
Chadha should have begun with a habeas petition in DC rather than~ 
seek CA review under Immigration and Naturalization Act (Act) ~ 
~ 
§106(a), 8 u.s.c. §1105a(a). As the pool memo notes at 5-7, the CA9 
may have erred in concluding it had jurisdiction. ~ The statute ~ ~}.1f 
-
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itself states that §106(a) review is available for review of §242(b) 
administrative proceedings. And in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 u.s. 
206 (1968), the Court held that jurisdiction under §106 is limited -
to review of administrative proceedings conducted under Act §242(b), 
8 U.S.C. §1252(b). In Cheng Fan, the challenge was to the AG's 
discretionary exercise of jurisdiction, and the Court ruled that 
that challenge could not be brought in a CA under §106(a) even 
though those actions were the logical prerequisite to administrative 
proceedings under §242(b). Similarly, in this case, Chadha seeks 
review of Congress' exercise of its discretionary veto power, not -the review of any administrative proceeding under §242(b). 
As this discussion suggests, it is most likely that if this 
Court were to consider this statutory question, it would reverse and 
hold that the CA9 did not have 'urisdiction over Chadha's challeng~ 
to his deportation order. Thus, if cert were granted, it is most ~ 
unlikely the one-house legislative veto issue could be reached.~~ 
~ If, however, the Court were to review on appeal, McLucas .. ~~ 
seems to indicate that the question of whether Chadha should have ~-i 
sued in theCA or the DC need not preclude this Court's review of 
the other issues in the case. McLucas seems directly applicable, 
and I am somewhat puzzled by the SG's failure to argue this point. 
Instead, the SG makes the difficult argument that the CA was the 
proper initial forum. Perhaps the SG missed the case. (He does 
cite it, but only to show the general purposes of §1252. See SG's 
Jurisdictional Statement n.9 at 13). 
There will be one disadvantage to this approach--ignoring 
whether the case was brought in the proper lower court--in terms of 
the record before the Court. As the memo points out at 7-8, the 
record only contains the administrative record, not information 
about the exercise of the legislative veto, and the latter 
information would presumably be before the Court if the case had 
begun as a habeas proceeding in DC. 
B. The Other Threshold Issues 
5. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this discussion presumes 
that the Court does not consider the case an inappropriate one in 
which to resolve a constitutional issue under Poe v. Ullman and that 
the Court decides there is appellate jurisdiction. (Whether the 
case can be reviewed on appeal is discused in the next section). 
The purpose of this section is to show that (given these 
assumptions) if the case were considered on appeal, and the 
"statutory question" was therefore avoided, it is quite likely the 
Court would reach the legislative-veto issue. 
The other threshold issues (threshold to whether the one-
house legislative veto is a justiciable question and, if it is, 
whether it is constitutional) are (1) Chadha's standing (a 
sererability-of-statutory-provisions question); 
(3) adversariness. 
(2) mootness; and 
1. Chadha'standing. The argument here is that Chadha 
cannot have standing to challenge Congress' veto of the AG's grant 
of an exemption for him because Congress would not have given the AG 
the power to grant excemptions if it had not been able to retain the 
power to overrule them. Thus, the provision giving the AG the power 
to overrule an exemption is not severable from the legislative-veto 
6 0 
provision, and, if neither provision had been enacted, Chadha would 
have been deported. 
Although the Act contains a severability provision (if one 
provision is invalid, other provisions remain in force} the 
legislative history provides strong support for the proposition that 
--------------~'------------------------------------------------------ --Congress would never have passed the statute had it not been abl~ to 
retain veto power • 
......_ ______ .--""\ 
If the Court were to rule that Chadha has no standing for 
this reason, however, Congress would be able to limit judicial 
review of constitutional issues by careful drafting. I think it ~ 
likely, therefore, that the Court will find that Chadha has standing ~ 
regardless of whether the grant of a power to the AG is severable /JL~ ---from the veto provision. 
2. Mootness. 
I I "\ 
The case is not technically moot--if the .........._...___. ..........._.__ 
Court were to reverse the CA9, Chadha would be subject to a 
deportation order. It is true that he is now married to an 
-----------------------------American, but that does not moot the case, though it suggests that 
it may be an inappropriate vehicle to resolve an important 
constitutional issue under Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497 (1961}, as 
discussed in my memo of Sept. 14 at 5-6. This discussion presumes, 
however, that Poe v. Ullman is not considered a barrier to this 
Court's review. Given that presumption, the mootness argument 
should not bar this Court from reaching the merits. 
3. Adversariness. As discussed in the pool memo at 14-15 
and my memo of Sept. 14 at 3-4, the presence of the House and Senate 
as amici is sufficient to provide adversariness for case-and-
controversy purposes under Lovett and Smith. 
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Thus, the "other" threshold issues are not likely to 
fragment the Court's decisional basis or bar review of the one-house 
legislative veto issue. 
C. Is an Appeal Possible? 
There are two distinct questions to be considered here. 
The first is whether the SG is right in arguing that the INS has 
standing to seek this Court's appellate jurisdiction in the absence 
of any disagreement with the decision below. The second is whether 
the Court can review the CA9 decision as an appeal under §1252. 
1. The SG's argument: the Court MUST exercise i i( §l252 
jurisdiction in this case. In his reply brief, the SG argues rather 
vehemently that INS has standing to bring an appeal regardless of 
whether it agrees with the decision below. (If you agree with the 
SG that this is a proper appeal, there is still a way out: dismiss 
for want of a properly presented federal question under Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), as discussed in my memo of Sept. 14 at 
5-6. ) • 
The SG presents four arguments. First, despite its 
concurrance with the CA9, the SG argues that INS's dual role as part 
of the Executive and as enforcer of the laws of Congress forms a 
basis for its appeal to this Court. The second argument is that the 
Lovett case, discussed by the House and Senate as the basis for 
their right to seek this Court's review on cert, indicates that 
there is jurisdiction over the INS appeal. The third argument is 
that §1252 authorizes this appeal. The fourth argument is that the 
House is wrong in maintaining that there was no case or controversy 
in the CA9. 
(a) The SG's first argument is that the INS can appeal 
because of its dual role as part of the ex~cutive branch and as 
enforcer of the laws of Congress. In the first part of this 
argument, the SG focuses on the fact that, had the CA9 not acted, 
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Chadha would have been deported by the INS regardless of how the INS 
felt about the constitutionality of the one-house legislative veto. 
This only proves that the CA9 had a case or controversy before it. 
That case was a type courts often hear despite the lack of any 
opposing party. As Wright and Miller point out, when a judicial 
decree is needed to establish a right or status, or assist in their 
enforcement, courts consider suits (such as suits seeking to 
establish title or obtain a certificate of naturalization) even 
though there is no adverse party. See 13 Wright & Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §3530 at 167. 
The fact that the CA9 was presented with a case or 
controversy does not, however, mean that this Court faces one. 
Here, Chadha's right to remain in the u.s. has already been 
established, and the INS does not argue that the grant of that right 
was improper. It is hornbook law that one who consents to a 
judgment can not challenge it on appeal, see 9 Moore's Federal 
Practice ,1203.06 at 3-27, and INS seems, in effect, to have -------
consented to the t. 
In the next portion of this argument, the SG attempts to 
distinguish the cases cited by the House and Senate for the 
proposition that INS is not an aggrieved party. The SG argues that 
in those cases, a pltf had received the requested relief, whereas 
here, the CA9 has issued an injuction restraining the INS from 
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enforcing the deportation order ordered by Congress. The SG argues 
that since it is a deft against whom injunctive relief has been 
granted, it can necessarily appeal. This argument ignores the 
principle mentioned in the preceeding paragraph: a deft who 
consents to entry of a judgment against him cannot appeal. INS 
seems to have consented to the entry of the injunction--indeed, it 
argued that that was the proper result to the CA9. I do not see how 
it can say it is aggrieved by getting precisely what it said it 
wanted. 
(b) The SG's second argument is that United States v. 
Lovett, 328 u.s. 303 (1946) supports this Court's appellate 
jurisdiction. As discussed in my earlier memo, that was a case in 
which the Court exercised its cert jurisdiction despite the fact 
that the U.S. and Lovett agreed with the decision below. But, in 
that case, amicus appeared for the Congress arguing the Act's 
constitutionality. If the House and Senate supported the appeal in 
their role as amicus in this case, I would agree that mandatory 
review is unavoidable under §1252. Instead, however, the House and 
Senate oppose the appeal. 
(c) The SG's next argument is his strongest: the language -
and purposes of §1252 support jurisdiction over the INS appeal. 
Section 1252 is rooted in the Act of Aug. 24, 1937, which was 
designed to curb onslaughts--what the Roosevelt administration 
regarded as guerilla raids--by federal courts upon the 
constitutionality of federal statutes. A direct appeal under §1252 
is restricted to judgments against constitutionality of acts of 
Congress, and the provision is designed to protect federal statutes 
against pr~tacks and provide for speedy resolution by 
this Court. See 12 Moore's Federal Practice ,[411.04 at 5-18. As ----
10. 
such, this Court has usually construed it generously. In McLucas v. 
Champlain, 421 u.s. 21 (1975) (Powell, J.), the Court held that a 
§1252 appeal can be brought regardless of whether the lower court 
h~ion. (In that case, it seemed likely the pltf should 
have asked for a three-judge court. If so, the failure was 
jurisdictional.). This construction is generous because the usual 
rule is, of course, that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction if 
the court below lacked jurisdiction. 
Against this background, a strong policy argument can be 
made supporting the INS's position. The executive may often 
disagree with Congress regarding the constitutionality of a statute. 
Moreover, the statute may not even be supported by the current 
Congress. In such a situation, unless the executive can seek this 
Court's review under §1252, an act will be held unconstitutional 
without the prompt consideration of this Court Congress intended to 
ensure when it enacted §1252. 
The problem with this argument is that, under the 
~-------------------- -
Constitution, the jurisdiction of Art. III courts is limited 
cases or controversies. Congress cannot create a case or 
controversy by identifying a policy interest served by this Court's 
review; advisory opinions would often serve important policy 
interests. 
Although there are no cases on all fours with this one 
(with an agency a party), the caselaw certainly suggests that this 
is not a case or controversy. In Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg 
11. 
Board of Education, 402 u.s. 47 (1971) (per curiam), for example, 
both sides supported the consitutionality of North Carolina's Anti-
Busing Law. They sought an order enjoining a DC from ordering 
busing. The Court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal 
because it was "confronted with the anomaly that both litigants 
desire precisely the same result, namely a holding that the anti-
busing staute is constitutional. There is, therefore, no case or 
controversy within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution." Id. 
at 48. After so holding, the Court went on to state that the lower 
Court also lacked jusdiction under §2281 because the suit was not an 
action brought to restrain a state officer from enforcing an 
unconstitutional state statute, i.e., there was no statutory 
jurisdictional basis. 
The SG argues that Moore 
"is readily distinguishable" because "[t]here the Court 
concluded that it did not have statutory jurisdiction over 
the appeal ••. because neither party sought an injunction 
prohibiting enforcement of a state statute alle ed to be 
unconstitutional. No such difficulty is present ere. 
The Court also concluded, after briefing and argument, 
that there was no controversy withing the meaning of Art. 
III •••. But, unlike in Moore, there could be no 
suggestion in the present case that the proceedings below 
constituted a feigned suit .••. " Reply of SG n.9 at 11 
(emphasis in original). 
I find this characterization of the cases somewhat 
disingenpous. The first holding in Moore is the lack of a 
r--
constitutional case or controvesy. The fact that the suit below was 
collusive below there, but not here, seems irrelevant to the 
question of whether this Court has jurisdiction if the action is 
collusive now. Surely the SG would not suggest that once 
jurisdiction is found, there will always be jurisdiction over a 
12. 
case. Indeed, I find Moore persausive authority for the fact that 
Congress could not give this Court juisdictlon over an appeal 
brought only by the INS, a party that agrees with the decision 
below. 
(d) The SG's final argument is that the House is wrong in 
arguing that the CA9 did not have jurisdiction. I agree with the SG 
for the reasons given in discussing his first argument--courts often 
decide question of status without opposition. Neither Chadha nor 
the INS seeks a change in Chada's status at the present time, 
however, so the fact that the CA9 had a case or controversy does not 
mean that this Court does. 
2. Can the Court review under §1252? I think the House 
and Senate oppose the appeal but petition for cert in an attempt to 
control the Court's decisional basis. If the case is reviewed on - ----cert, the threshold "statutory" question (what lower court should 
have been used--CA9 or DC?) will likely be tha basis for overruling 
the CA9's decision without allowing this Court to hold that the one-
house legislative veto is unconstitutional. On appeal, the Court 
could skip that issue, as discussed at 3-5 supra. 
There was only one decision below. Yet the House and 
Senate have each filed briefs in two "cases" here: the oppositions -to appeal in the INS appeal and the petitions for cert in their own 
cases. The oppositions argue that the INS appeal cannot be brought 
because INS is not aggrieved and there is, therefore, no case or 
controversy. That is, however, true only because the House and 
Senate are not arguing a position opposite to the INS's in their 
13. 
oppositions. They do, however, take such positions in their cert 
petitions. 
I think the Court is free to ignore the captions the House 
and Senate have placed on their briefs. They seek this Court's 
review of the CA9 deicision--a decision that comes within the terms 
of §1252: the u.s. was a party and an act of Congress was held 
unconstitutional. They have indicated that they will argue that 
that decision is wrong, so there is a case or controversy for the 
Court to consider~ think the Court can therefore look beyond the 
oppositions to the appeal, consider the petns for cert, and "note" --- ~ 
the appeal on the basis of all the briefs fired by those who have 
submitted jurisdictional s~ements or oppositions in the INS 
appeal. On the other hand, I think the Court is equally free to 
dismiss the appeal because the only party seeking the appeal (INS) 
has no standing to object to the CA9 decision. 
It is stange to say that the Court has discretion to decide 
whether to exercise §1252 appellate jurisdiction: the purpose of 
the statute was to create non-discretionary jurisdiction in 
instances where Congress thought S. Ct. review should not be 
delayed. This result is, however, consistent with the policies of 
§1252 in that it will enable the Court to take an appeal described 
in the statute and thus one Congress thought should be considered 
quickly--and Court will be able to do so without dismissing just 
because the proceedings began in the wrong lower federal court (see 
McLucas, discussed at 3-4 supra). 
' 
D. Should the CA9 Decision be vacated if this Court declines ~ 






If this Court declines review of the appeal either because 
(1) INS, the only party seeking appellate r~view has no standing to 
do so, or (2) this case is an inappropriate vehicle for the 
resolution of a difficult constitutional issue, you might want to 
consider whether the CA9 decision should be left standing. At the 
time the CA9 decision was handed down, Chadha was already married. 
{) 
The Court could therefore vacate it in the light of Pe v. Ullman 
(inappropriate vehicle) regardless of which reason this Court has 
declined review. I have no strong feelings on this point and merely 
present it as a possibility. 
RECOMMENDATION 
I have no firm recommendation. For some reason I cannot 
understand, these legislative-veto cases do not seem to come up very 
frequently. The last case before the Court was Atkins v. United 
States, 556 F. 2d 1028 (Ct. Clms. 1977) (en bane) (per curiam) 
{upholding constitutionality), cert denied 434 u.s. 1009 (1978). 
That case involved a one-house veto barring an increase in salary 
for federal judges, and the Court probably considered it an unseemly 
case in which to decide the issue. As far as I can tell, that 
decision and the CA9 decision below are the only rulings on the 
constitutionaliy of legislative vetos. See J. Henry, The 
Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 Harv. J. 
Legis. 735, 7738-39 (1979). 
The rarity of cases cannot be explained in terms of the 
rarity of Congress' use of the legislative veto. A 1979 article 
reports that, between 1932 and 1975, 295 legislative veto provision 
were enacted in 196 statutes (most of these were enacted between 
15. 
1966 and 1979). Id. at 736 n.S. Nor can the rarity be explained in 
terms of general acceptance of their legality. Every President 
since Woodrow Wilson has questioned their constitutionality; 
Attorney Generals have often argued against them, legal scholars 
have engaged in extensive debates over them, and even many members 
of Congress have doubted their constitutionality. See id. at 737-38 
n.7. 
Perhaps these cases come up so seldom because of standing 
(standing to challenge an act of Congress) problems--that is, 
however, a pure guess. If I knew more about the 295 statutes, I 
might be able to see other explanations. 
It 
I tend to think this case is probably not an appropriate 
\' vehicle to resolve the dispute under Poe v. Ullman. I have now 
convinced myself that the Court is free to take or decline the 
appeal and, were it not for the Poe v. Ullman problem would tend to 
think the appeal should be noted. It is true that even if the case 
is considered under §1252 (thus avoiding the "statutory" question) 
it is not the cleanest of cases. On the other hand, I do not think 
any of the other issues are either extemely close or impossibly 
difficult. Given that these cases do not, for some strange reason, 
appear before this Court very often, I would probably take the 
appeal (were it not for the Poe v. Ullman problem). 
SUMMARY 
If you think that Poe v. Ullman, discussed in my memo of 
Sept. 14 at 5-6, bars review of the case, then the appeal should be 
dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question and the 
petns for cert should be denied. 
16. 
On the other hand, the fact that Chadha will actually be 
subject to a deportation order if this Court overrules the CA9 may 
be regarded as sufficient practical impact to avoid any Poe v. 
Ullman problem. Mrs. Chadha is, of course, a third party to the 
suit and there are doubtless lots of situations in which third 
parties can moot an action, but courts nevertheless resolve the 
controversy without worrying too much about Poe v. Ullman. 
If you see this case as distinguishable from Poe v. Ullman, 
the next question is whether there is any difference between noting 
(or postponing) the appeal and granting cert. I think that the most 
difficult threshold issue (whether Chadha should have sued in DC 
rather than in the CA9) can be avoided only if the case is heard on 
appeal. If you agree, it would be appropriate to deny cert 
regardless of whether you want to hear the merits of the case. 
If you do not agree that the difficult "statutory" question 
can be avoided in a §1252 appeal, then you will probably not want to 
consider this case either on appeal or cert. It is quite likely the 
case should have been brought in DC rather than the CA9: if the 
"statutory" question (which is proper court?) is before the Court, 
it is therefore unlikely the Court will be able to reach the 
constitutionality of the one-house legislative veto in this case. 
The next question is whether the appeal must be noted (or 
postponed) . Because the House and Senate oppose the CA9 opinions in 
their petitions for cert, though not in their briefs in the INS 
appeal, I think the court is free to take the appeal or dismiss. It 
can dismiss the appeal because no aggrieved party seeks this Court's 
appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, it can note (or 
17. 
postpone) the appeal because the House and Senate do oppose the CA9 
decision, thus providing the necessary constitutional adversariness, 
and the appeal comes within the terms of §1251: an appeal from a 
decision holding an act of Congress unconstitutional in a case in 
which the u.s. is a party. 
The next question is whether you want to take the case on 
appeal. At this point, you have agreed that the "statutory 
question" can be avoided by a §1252 appeal, that the House and 
Senate provide the requisite adversarines, and that Poe v. Ullman 
does not bar this Court's review. Only two threshold issues remain. 
The first is whether Chadha has standing to challenge Congress' 
action because two key provisions of the Act are not severable: the 
provision giving the AG discretion to exempt someone from 
deportation and the provision in which Congress retains the power to 
override the AG's exemption with a legislative veto. The argument 
is that if neither these two provisions were in force, Chadha would 
be deported, and since Congress would not have enacted one without 
the other, he is not harmed by Congress' exercise of its veto to 
order him deportated. This argument is not likely to succeed, 
however, because it would allow Congress to insulate these actions 
from judicial review. 
The remaining threshold question is whether the case is 
moot, and it is easily resolved. If the Court were to overrule the 
CA9 decision, Chadha would immediately be subject to a deportation 
order. It cannot, therefore, be said that the case is technically 
moot. 
lH. 
Because these legislatve-veto challenges do not come before 
the Court often, you might want to take thi's case if you think the 
Conference will agree to take the case as a §1252 appeal (skipping 
the "statutory question") and if you think the conference will not 
split on the decisional basis--i.e., the Conference will agree that 
(1) the appeal can be noted (or postponed) because the House and 
Senate provide the necessary adversariness; (2) the case is neither 
moot nor an inappropriate vehicle to resolve the constitutional 
issue under Poe v. Ullman; (3) a §1252 appeal avoids the "statutory 
question" of what lower court Chadha should have used; and (3) 
Chadha has standing to challenge his deportation despite the fact 
that Congress probably would not have given the AG the authority to 
grant an exemption if it had not retained the power to veto (Chadha 
would therefore have been deported anyway had the challenged statute 
not been enacted). 
If the Conference is likely to disagree on any of these 
threshold issues, you will probably want to avoid review. 
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